Corporate governance, firm performance and type of ownership by Ekeland, Anders
STEP rapport / report ISSN 0804-8185 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
R-15
• 
2002 
Anders Ekeland 
 
Corporate governance, firm 
performance and type of 
ownership 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Anders Ekeland 
STEP Group 
Hammersborg torg 3 
N-0179 Oslo, Norway 
 
Oslo, December 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hammersborg torg 3, 0179 Oslo, Norway 
Telephone +47 2286 8010 
Fax +47 2286 8049 
http://www.step.no/ 
 
 
STEP publiserer to ulike serier av 
skrifter: Rapporter og Arbeids-
notater.  
Publikasjonene i begge seriene kan lastes ned gratis fra 
våre internettsider. 
STEP Rapportserien 
I denne serien presenterer vi våre 
viktigste forskningsresultater. Vi 
offentliggjør her data og analyser som 
belyser viktige problemstillinger relatert 
til innovasjon, teknologisk, økonomisk og 
sosial utvikling, og offentlig politikk. 
STEP maintains two diverse series of 
research publications: Reports and 
Working Papers. 
Both reports and working papers can be downloaded at 
no cost from our internet web site. 
The STEP Report Series 
In this series we report our main research 
results. We here issue data and analyses 
that address research problems related to 
innovation, technological, economic and 
social development, and public policy. 
 
Redaktører for seriene:  
Editors for the series: 
Finn Ørstavik (1998-2000) 
Per M. Koch (2000) 
 
© Stiftelsen STEP 2000 
 
Henvendelser om tillatelse til oversettelse, kopiering 
eller annen mangfoldiggjøring av hele eller deler av 
denne publikasjonen skal rettes til: 
Applications for permission to translate, copy or in other 
ways reproduce all or parts of this publication should be 
made to: 
STEP, Hammersborg torg 3 
0179 Oslo, Norway 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 
Introduction......................................................................................................................................... 1 
A brief empirical overview of ownership structures in Norway......................................................... 5 
The theoretical background for empirical research............................................................................. 9 
The challenges and problems of regression analysis ........................................................................ 13 
The findings of Bøhren and Ødegaard – from the bivariate to the full multivariate model.............. 17 
Significance, equilibrium and policy ................................................................................................ 21 
Summary and conclusions ................................................................................................................ 25 

 Introduction 
 
This paper originated as a spin-off from the TSER-project ‘Corporate Governance, 
Innovation, and Economic Performance in the EU,’ coordinated by William 
Lazonick and Mary O’Sullivan.1  
 
The aim of this paper is to discuss the relationship between theory and data in the 
corporate governance literature from a policy perspective. This is a literature 
dominated by a neo-classical approach to economic issues. Does the empirical work 
done in this tradition confirm the claim that corporate governance understood as an 
agency problem is important for the creation of wealth, for the performance of firms, 
and consequently for economic growth? More precisely, it is the importance of 
certain structural characteristics of firms that are regarded as proxies for various 
aspects of the agency problem that are analysed. There seems to be a consensus 
among the researchers in neo-classical tradition that ownership characteristics, like 
ownership concentration, type of owner, inside/outside ownership are predicted by 
the underlying theory to be the most important factors for corporate governance.  
 
It is of course impossible to go through this vast literature2 and that is not necessary 
since our focus here is a more general evaluation of this genre of research. What 
interests us is not one particular paper, rather whether this approach to corporate 
governance can serve as a basis for policy formulation.   
 
Since this paper focus on corporate governance in Norway I will try to say something 
about this type of empirical research by looking at one recent Norwegian paper 
which I see as representative, as “typical”, of this type of empirical research. The 
paper is Øvind Bøhren and Bernt Arne Ødegaard, “Corporate governance and 
economic performance: A closer look”  from November 20013. There are several 
reasons for focussing on the Bøhren and Ødegaard paper. They are using data from 
OSE that are unique in their detail and coverage. They test their data with different 
models etc. Secondly I use a recent PhD thesis by Henrik Mathiesen, “Managerial 
Ownership and Financial Performance” (2002) that analyses US firms, also using 
the best data available. But in this context it is the extensive overview and comments 
on the existing literature that makes this PhD particularly useful for our purpose.  
 
Both Mathiesen’s PhD thesis and Bøhren and Ødegaard are in my opinion very well-
written papers both from a technical and theoretical point of view. Both are very 
careful in explaining possible statistical problems and consequently are very well 
                                                 
1 See William Lazonick and Mary O’Sullivan, Perspectives on Corporate Governance, Innovation, 
and Economic Performance, report to ‘Corporate Governance, Innovation, and Economic 
Performance in the EU,’ a research project funded by the Targeted Socio-Economic Research (TSER) 
Programme of the European Commission (DGXII) under the Fourth Framework Programme, 
coordinated by William Lazonick and Mary O’Sullivan. This is the main theoretical document from 
the TSER-project.  
2 Mathiesen 2002 gives an overview of previous research in some very condensed and useful tables. 
Se also Gugler (2001) 
3 This paper can be seen as a short version of Øvind Bøhren and Bernt Arne Ødegaard (2001b) 
:Corporate governance and economic performance in Norwegian listed firms, November 26, 2001, 
230 p. This paper has some more detailed analysis and a large data appendix, but the analyses in the 
two papers are very similar.  
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suited to serve as a vehicle for a broader debate on the policy implications. Both 
papers use the best US and Norwegian data available. In addition I will refer to an 
often quoted overview paper by Andrei Shleifer and Robert W Vishny: “A Survey of 
Corporate Governance” as a representative expression of the theoretical reasoning 
that underlies this type of empirical research.4  Both Bøhren and Ødegaard and 
Mathiesen refer to this paper.  
 
This is a rather technical literature and a certain amount of knowledge of regression 
analysis is necessary in order to read it. Our aim in this paper is to try to highlight the 
fundamental theoretical issues and the most important potential policy consequences 
of the regression results without going too far into statistical and technical details.  
 
This paper is organised in the following way. I start out with an overview of the 
ownership structure of firms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) in order to 
make it easier for the reader to follow the discussion of the empirical results that 
Bøhren and Ødegaard presents. Most of these tables are taken form various papers by 
Bøhren and Ødegaard, who have done a truly impressive job in collecting, organising 
and tabulating the data on ownership of firms listed on the OSE. No stone is 
unturned as far as I can see. Their data cover the period from 1989 to 1997. When 
possible the time series have been extended to 2000 and 2001.  
 
After this background of descriptive statistics I analyse some theoretical issues, 
especially the question of whether the economy is in equilibrium, because this issue 
is very decisive for the interpretation of the results. Then I go into a bit more detail 
regarding the regression analysis, trying to discuss both the robustness and the 
possible policy implications of these results. It seems to me that there is a certain 
lack of critical reflection in this literature about what the policy implications of the 
empirical results should or could be. In my opinion this is so because a more 
thorough discussion of policy results would pose rather sharply a range of questions. 
Questions about whether the economy actually is in equilibrium, or is moving 
towards equilibrium. In my opinion these questions would challenge the static 
equilibrium, homo economicus that poses corporate governance as primarily an 
agency problem.  Another way to formulate this is to ask: do the results and analysis 
serve as guidance for private and public decision makers?  If not, is that because the 
results from this detailed empirical research of ownership structures do not have 
feasible policy implications? Our tentative answers to this are, first of all, that the 
results are not sufficiently statistically significant.  Secondly, to the extent that they 
are significant, they tend to be contradictory, or at least to contradict what I would 
expect from the theories that form the bases for this research, and finally that even if 
one holds that the results are sufficiently statistically significant and robust – one 
have to seriously consider if the policy implications that might flow from them are 
feasible. 
  
My hypothesis is that that ownership structures, like concentration of ownership, 
type of owner are not that important for the economic performance firms. I think that 
the ownership structures must more or less be taken as given as a set of exogenous 
conditions formed by a long legal and business history, specific to each country and 
industrial sector. It is the business strategy of individual firms that really matters for 
                                                 
4 Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, ‘A Survey of Corporate Governance,’ The Journal of 
Finance, Vol. LII, No. 2, June 1997, pp. 737-783. 
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performance and they are not significantly correlated with ownership structures. By 
business strategy I mean innovation strategy, including R&D strategy, leadership 
style, etc., and these issues are not to any great extent determined by ownership 
structures or agency problems as they are formulated in the mainstream corporate 
governance literature. In my opinion there is a lot of heterogeneity in business 
strategy among firms with very similar ownership structures. Even if ownership 
structures had been shown to be important for performance, it might be that certain 
types of ownership are just an indicator of the real cause – the management 
ideologies, attitudes and practices that condition performance. In other words it 
would be a proxy for the real cause. And since a business strategy – which showed 
itself clearly superios - is a things that can be learned by firms with different 
ownership structures, this learning process would over time tend to reduce the 
correlation between ownership structures and performance, so that I would not 
expect it even to be a good proxy for such strategies.  One could also argue that the 
nature of competition is such that pure imitation cannot generally be a successful 
strategy, and that consequently there will be a complex game of strategies and 
counter strategies. In any case the question whether ownership structures correlates 
with certain business strategies is another than the agency problem that is at the 
reason for most studies of corporate governance.  
 
There is in addition the problem of reversed causation. That is that performance 
determines ownership structures, and not the other way around. One example - also 
mentioned by Bøhren and Ødegaard - is that if performance tends to be poorer in 
state owned than in privately owned firms this might be  because the states comes in 
when private investors and managers have failed. The high level of state ownership 
in Norwegian banks caused by the deep crisis in the financial sector in the early and 
mid nineties is a recent and clear example of this “reverse” causation. Another is that 
managers might buy (more) shares when the firm is performing well, so that both 
ownership concentration and inside ownership are caused by performance, and not 
the other way around.  
 
The modest aim of this paper is to study some recent empirical studies of corporate 
governance and to see if they are able to show by statistical modelling that corporate 
governance really matters for performance. And that is a question well worth 
studying even if the tentative answer is negative.  
 
 

 A brief empirical overview of ownership structures in Norway5 
In the following section I will try to give a brief overview of concentration and 
ownership as a background for the discussion of the modelling and the regressions. 
The Corporate governance project at the Norwegian School of Management has done 
an impressive job in collecting and ordering data, so there is no reason not to “stand 
on their shoulders”. The tables are focussed on the concentration and type of 
ownership since these are two of the most discussed topics in the corporate 
governance debate.  
 
Bøhren and Ødegaard focus on listed firms since only about them do we have 
extensive data on market value and various ownership characteristics. The 
importance of the firms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) grew steadily over 
this period and the market value of the listed firms reached 43% of Norwegian GDP 
in 1997 which was close to the European median of 49%, but below the global 
average of 65%. But roughly speaking the role of listed firms in Norway is the same 
as in other developed market economies.  
 
The table below shows the ownership structures of firms listed on the Oslo Stock 
Exchange over a ten year period.  
Table 1 Shareholder structure 31.12 every year, 1990 – 2001 
   
Foreign 
investors 
 
Financial 
companies
Non-
financial 
companies
 
 
Private
 
Public 
sector 
 
 
Unknown 
 
 
Total
1990 27,20 15,70 29,60 12,90 14,50 0,10 100
1991 28,70 16,40 27,60 11,20 15,80 0,00 100
1992 28,90 16,10 22,00 11,10 21,70 0,20 100
1993 28,30 16,70 22,00 11,40 21,60 0,00 100
1994 30,50 15,40 19,70 9,80 24,60 0,00 100
1995 33,20 15,90 19,80 9,30 21,80 0,00 100
1996 33,59 17,73 17,82 9,15 20,37 1,34 100
1997 31,15 20,03 24,90 7,72 16,15 0,05 100
1998 31,71 20,59 22,85 7,77 16,93 0,16 100
1999 31,51 20,58 21,99 7,84 16,85 1,21 100
2000 34,11 16,05 17,36 7,73 24,57 0,19 100
2001 28,01 12,3 13,52 5,92 39,02 1,25 100
Source: Oslo Stock Exchange 
 
 
The overall picture is one of stability. The clearest trend is that the share of private 
individuals declines. Probably the increased propensity to use various types of share 
based saving funds explains this trend. The other ownership categories change their 
share, but there is no clear trend. State ownership changes markedly in this period. 
First it changes in 1992-1993 as a consequence of the crisis in the banking sector. In 
this period several major banks were taken over by the state. The changes in 2000 
                                                 
5 Research assistance in gathering up to data information on listed firms by Kari-Mette Stavhaug is 
gratefully acknowledged. 
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and 2001 are a result of the transformation of companies like Telenor and Statoil 
from state owned to semi-privatized companies on the OSE.  
 
Table 2 The concentration of voting rights in Europe and the US 
 No. of 
firms 
 
Year 
 
Owner size rank  
 
Relative owner size 
Country   1 2 3  1/2  1/3  2/3 
Austria 50 1996 54 8 3 6.8. 18.0 2.7 
Belgium 135 1995 56 7 5 8.0 11.2 1.4 
France 674 1996 52 10 4 5.2 13.0 2.5 
Germany 372 1996 50 3 1 16.7 50.0 3.0 
Italy 214 1996 48 10 4 4.8 12.0 2.5 
Netherlands 137 1996 43      
Spain 193 1995 40 11 6 3.6 6.7 1.8 
Sweden 304 1998 38 11 6 3.5 6.3 1.8 
Mean Europe (ex N and UK)     48 9 4 5.6 11.5 2.1 
UK 250 1992 14 7 6 2.0 2.3 1.2 
Mean Europe (ex N)     44 8 4 5.2 10.0 1.9 
US 2831 1997 3 1 1 3.0 3.0 1.0 
Mean Western World (ex N)     40 8 4 5.3 10.0 1.9 
Norway 130 1997 29 11 7 2.6 4.1 1.6 
Source: Bøhren and Ødegaard (2000)  p. 44, table 27 
 
 
The difference between the US and the UK, on the one hand, and most European 
countries, on the other, is striking, even the difference between the US and UK is 
significant. Norway is somewhere in between, but with the largest owner typically on 
average having 30 % of the voting rights, Norway appears as more “European” than 
Anglo-American.  Norway is closer to Sweden than the UK. If this table had 
contained Third World countries and developed market economies with a large and 
systematic difference – then it would have been tempting to draw some conclusions. 
But all of these countries are advanced market economies, and besides normal 
business cycles, they are all prospering economies. The point is that such great 
differences in ownership concentration do not lead to very different types of firms. 
The reason for this might be that the concentration of ownership is not that 
important, and as Bøhren and Ødegaard report themselves, the most of the findings 
on concentration are either that is positive or not significant. But as I shall see later 
Bøhren and Ødegaard find a strong negative correlation.  
 
Germany is a special case due to very great concentration of shares in the hands of 
the largest shareholder. The second and third are relatively much smaller than in any 
other country.  
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Table 3 The propensity to hold large equity stakes in Norwegian listed firms, 1989 - 
1997 
Owner size rank  
Owner type 1 2 3 4 5 Sum
State 9 7 5 4 4 29
International 19 21 23 25 26 114
Individuals 10 8 9 10 10 47
Financials 11 21 25 28 30 115
Nonfinancials 52 43 37 33 30 195
Sum, percent 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Bøhren and Ødegaard, “Characteristics of an outlier”, p. 29, table 17 
 
The table shows for each owner type (State, International etc) the share of firms 
where the owner type hold the largest, second, third, fourth and fifth largest equity 
stake, i.e. the ownership rank. 
 
The table clearly shows that the state and individuals are not involved among the five 
largest owners as often as the other groups, but the size of those companies where the 
state is among the largest owners of course makes state ownership very important. 
For the other groups the nonfinancials, i.e. other firms are clearly much more 
frequently the largest owner and this despite the fact that their share of the total value 
of shares on OSE is 24%. In contrast the International owners having the largest 
share of these owner types with 31% is less often holding the biggest or second 
largest share in individual firms.  The nonfinancials is the most frequent for all the 
first four ranks, only to be matched by financials as the fifth largest owner.  
 
Table 4 The aggregate holding by the five basic owner types in eleven European 
countries 
 Year State Inter-
national 
Indi-
viduals 
Finan-
cials 
Non-
financial
s 
Austria 1996 10 16 57 9 8 
Belgium 1997 0 34 25 15 27 
France 1993 6 22 32 23 16 
Finland 1997 21 32 16 12 19 
Germany 1997 3 12 17 37 31 
Iceland 1996 11 2 33 25 30 
Italy 1994 24 7 26 22 22 
Spain 1997 6 37 29 23 6 
Sweden 1997 8 32 15 31 15 
Mean (ex N and UK)   10 22 28 22 19 
UK 1997 0 16 25 58 2 
Mean (ex N)   9 21 28 26 18 
Norway 1997 16 31 8 20 25 
Source: Bøhren and Ødegaard, Characteristics of an outlier,  p. 43, table 26 
 
There are many aspects of this table that could be commented. What are the reasons 
why Iceland and Italy having a significantly lower share of international ownership 
than other developed marked economies? The UK has a very high share of 
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financials, and almost no non-financials, why is this so? Are the numbers really 
reliable? Focussing on Norway I see again that it is the low share of individual 
ownership that is most striking, but of course this low individual share means that 
state is high, but both Italy and Finland are higher, and the mean without UK is 10. 
But there are rather varied profiles when it comes to ownership types. 
 
A small bullet point summary6 
 
• Firrms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange play a modest but increasingly 
larger role in the Norwegian economy as in other European countries 
• Although individual (personal) investors are by far the most numerous group, 
their share of the total value is small and decreasing. Norway has the lowest 
share of individual ownership, clearly below 10% versus the mean around 
30% in the rest of Europe. 
• International investors hold the largest share of the total value. Financial 
investors in general and mutual funds in particular are increasing their share 
• State ownership varies markedly over time, due to the rescue operations and 
the introduction of huge state companies on the OSE. 
 
Some aspects of the Norwegian ownership structure are clearly different from most 
of the other European countries, but it is not extremely different. There is 
considerable variations in ownership structures in other European countries, there is 
no very clear pattern emerging from the available data. That means that the 
relationship between ownership structure and long term economic growth is not a 
one to one relationship.  
                                                 
6 In Bøhren and Ødegaard (2000), with the telling title of “The ownership structure of 
Norwegian firms: The characteristics of an outlier”, there is a set of summary tables at pages 
49 - 51 that should be consulted to get a short and precise description of the main 
characteristiscs of the Norwegian ownership structure. http://finance.bi.no/~finance/
 
 The theoretical background for empirical research 
According to Bøhren and Ødegaard the key question of finance based corporate 
governance research is whether firm value is driven by corporate governance 
mechanisms, such as: 
 
• Overall legal protection of the investor 
• Competitive environment,  
• Size and type of owners  
• Ownership concentration 
• Equity holdings by management 
• Design of the corporate charter 
• Decisions made at the stockholder meeting 
• Composition of the board 
• The firm’s financial policy 
• Design of managements employment contracts.  
 
This is of course not an exhaustive list, and it seems that some mechanisms attract 
much more attention from researchers than others and that is those related to the 
agency problem, that is the separation between ownership and control in the modern 
stock company. Most research is focussed on the some of these governance 
mechanisms, namely: the role of equity holdings by management, the level of 
concentration of ownership, and the type of owner.  
 
The agency problem and its importance are formulated as by Shleifer and Vishny in 
the following way:  
 
At first glance, it is not entirely obvious why the suppliers of capital get 
anything back. After all they part with their money, and have little to 
contribute to the enterprise afterward. The professional managers or 
entrepreneurs who run the firms might as well abscond with the money. 
Although they sometimes do, usually they do not. Most advanced market 
economies have solved the problem of corporate governance at least 
reasonably well, in that they have assured the flows for enormous amounts of 
capital to firms, and actual repatriation of profits to the providers of finance. 
But this does not imply that they have solved the corporate governance 
problem perfectly, or that the corporate governance mechanisms cannot be 
improved.  
 In fact the subject of corporate governance is of enormous practical 
importance. Even in the advanced market economies, there is a great deal of 
disagreement on how good or bad the existing governance mechanisms are. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p. 737). 
 
This is the question that I will try to shed some light on in this note; what are the 
answers given by the empirical research around the question of how good or bad the 
existing corporate governance mechanisms are. Shleifer and Vishny bring forward 
anecdotal evidence arguing that managers in fact do waste the investors money and 
that they need to be tightly controlled by the best incentive structures possible. It is 
tempting to discuss these anecdotes in some detail the but I will focus on one aspect, 
research and development costs. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) write : 
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 “When contracts are incomplete and managers possess more expertise than 
shareholders, managers typically end up with the residual rights of control, 
giving them enormous latitude for self-interested behaviour.” Shleifer and 
Vishny summarise evidence on what type of “discretionary spending” that for 
example large shareholders are more able to reduce and mention advertising, 
research and development and entertainment expenses. Shleifer and Vishny (1997, 
p. 744, p. 755) 
 
I find it a bit surprising to be equally critical of R&D and entertainment spending. To 
cut down on R&D might just as well be a sign of short sighted cash flow maximising 
and not any long term maximising of profits. And managers might in many cases 
have more intimate knowledge on the firms need for R&D. In most cases that is not 
costs which they themselves get any direct benefit from. On the contrary in many 
cases it involves well-known risks of research projects getting delayed, being much 
more costly than originally planned etc.  
 
Equilibrium and/or natural selection? 
Before one starts to dive into either descriptive statistics of ownership or the 
statistical details of regression models, one should ask if one should expect to find 
some significant relation between corporate governance mechanisms like ownership 
structures and performance. This turns out not to be such a simple or innocent 
question since it turns out to be a question of whether one assumes that the economy 
is in, or at least close to, equilibrium.   
 
The equilibrium hypothesis brings all the mechanisms together by stating that 
if all of them are applied in a value-maximizing way, all of them satisfy the 
zero marginal value condition. That is, any mechanism is used up to the point 
where a small change leaves firm value practically un-altered. According to 
Demsetz (1983), this means that if firms are owned by value-maximizing 
investors who understand how to select governance mechanisms which 
minimize agency costs, corporate governance and firm performance will be 
unrelated in equilibrium. This is far from saying that governance is irrelevant 
for performance. Since two firms may have widely different sets of optimal 
mechanisms, the equilibrium condition implies that if I run a cross-sectional 
regression of performance on governance mechanisms, no mechanism will be 
significantly related to performance if the governance systems I observe in 
practice are the optimal ones. Conversely, a significant variable reflects a 
disequilibrium and a source for improved performance. 7 
 
 
This way of formulating the problem leaves some questions unanswered, all related 
to the issue of whether the economy is in equilibrium, or so close to equilibrium that 
one can argue and reason “as if “ it was equilibrium. Or it might at least be on its 
way to long run equilibrium by its own spontaneous mechanisms.  First of all, if the 
economy is in equilibrium or on its way to equilibrium, then it is just accidental that I 
find significant variables. Then even if I find significant varialbles this will only be 
                                                 
7 Bøhren and Ødegaard (2001a), p. 6 
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temporary, and consequently that will have no policy implications. No policy 
measures are need.  
 
On the other hand if the economy is fundamentally out of equilibrium in a way  that 
it needs ad hoc or constant regulation from “outside” forces in order to get closer to 
the equilibrium fix point, does not that contradict the underlying hypothesis that 
markets left to themselves lead us to the economic optimum?  These fundamental 
question are not much discussed. Because if the economy is not in equilibrium; if 
there is pervasive “bounded rationality”, very many imperfect markets – then 
significant mechanisms do not necessarily mean disequilibrium. But in this case the 
theoretical and consequently the policy conclusions would probably be rather 
different. Mathiesen (2002) is more explicit on this question:  
 
“The natural selection argument proposes that financial performance 
determines ownership in the sense that ownership structures with insufficient 
performance will fail to survive in the long run. … This argument is used to 
justify a much more general hypothesis… namely the hypothesis that all 
kinds of economic organizations (not just different ownership structures) 
perform equally well. The reason is that competition among economic 
organizations in the end should be able to sort out inefficient organizational 
forms. Therefore, in the long run at least, only the efficient organizations 
prevail. In general such an efficiency hypothesis can be criticized for leaving 
unanswered questions. For instance – how long is the long run? Furthermore, 
to the degree that surviving organizations adapt to the changes in the 
environment, how quickly do they adapt, and what are the costs. Despite 
these objections efficiency arguments are among the most popular kinds of 
hypothesis in economics. An important reason is that the acceptance of non-
efficiency arguments is equivalent to accepting that humans organize 
themselves inefficiently, and furthermore that selection mechanisms such as 
the market mechanism or human rationality are unable to ensure that only the 
most efficient organizations survive. Such view are simply too pessimistic for 
many economists who believe that human rationality in conjunction with 
market selection is capable of overcoming most, or perhaps all inefficiencies, 
at least in the long run. Mathiesen (2002, p. 21) 
 
 
But Mathiesen does not answer this question himself, so I still do not know how long 
is “the long run”. What he does is to describe how strong the belief in such 
selection/efficiency arguments is among economists, also among those studying 
corporate governance. But in my opinion this is less the question of optimism or 
pessimism, but that discard this particular type of efficiency arguments would be 
paradigm shift, a scientific revolution in the Kuhnian sense in the science of 
economics. Since such a paradigm shift is not on the order of the day, Mathiesen - 
after having posed the problem ends up with a theoretical underpinning of the agency 
problem and the consequences for statistical modelling that is a mix of equilibrium 
and very ad hoc disequilibrium reasoning. Just like Bøhren and Ødegaard and most 
other researchers in this field. 
 
But as soon as you open up for the possibility that for the stock market might for 
long periods significantly overvalue or undervalue firms to rely primarily or 
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exclusively on stock market valuation as the performance measure will need to be 
theoretically and empirically discussed in much more detail. What is the “real” value 
of firms and its relation to the stock market values should be studied taking the very 
rapid rise and fall of stock market values over the last decade as its starting point. A 
discussion of various theories of stock market bubbles is beyond the scope of this 
article. But as I shall see below, what results that turn out to be significant depend to 
a very large degree on the performance measure you chose. Consequently the choice 
of performance measure determines what kind of disequilibria you will try to correct 
in order to improve the performance. Of course as mentioned above, it all depends on 
your “world view”. That is if you do consider such deviations from equilibrium are 
temporary and transient, then of course you just lean back and wait for the self 
correcting mechanisms of the market to do their salient work in the always 
unspecified “long run”. Or Bøhren and Ødegaard as formulate it: “When product, 
labour and take-over markets are fully competitive, self-serving managers will 
maximise their expected utility by maximising stockholders’ equity value. … 
Competition is the only governance mechanism needed, and it works without owner 
interference.” (p. 4).  
 
Then fundamental question then becomes - do competition basically work as 
expected by the neo-classical theory? If not, if the mechanisms of the market, of 
competition do not work according to neo-classical theory, how does it then work, 
and what consequences do that have for the formulation the problem of corporate 
governance as an agency problem. 
 
 
 The challenges and problems of regression analysis 
The challenges and problems with the empirical research in this area as Bøhren and 
Ødegaard see them might be summarized very briefly under three headings: data, 
univariate versus multivariate regression and single equation versus simultaneous 
equation system regression. 
 
Problems with data 
Most studies are using only one year. Most studies have data on ownership only in 
discrete steps >=5%, 10%, 20%, 50% since data are registered only at warning 
thresholds. The Norwegian data do not suffer from such defects since there are time 
series and very detailed ownership data. There is a difference in the kind of firms in 
the samples. Most studies are done with a limited number of very large US firms. 
The Oslo Stock Exchange firms are quite another type of firms, smaller in an 
international context, more like other European listed firms.  
 
Bivariate and not multivariate studies 
Only one mechanism is studied at the time. One studies ownership concentration, but 
often  without looking at the same time at insider ownership, another obvious 
candidate for performance boosting corporate governance mechanisms and possibly 
related to the degree of concentration8.  
 
 
Endogenous and exogenous varialbles 
Corporate governance mechanisms are seen as independent and exogenous. An 
important difference between single equation and simultaneous techniques is the 
ability of simultaneous equation systems to test for endogeneity. That is, some of the 
corporate governance mechanisms are internally related, for example a certain 
combination of outside directors and insider holdings.  The same goes for “reversed” 
causality, that is when good performance leads to managers asking for stock opition 
plans, or to buying shares based on their inside information. The important point here 
is that the findings one get using simultaneous systems “differ quite remarkably from 
those using single-equation methods”9.  The problem of endogeneity is seldom 
addressed, but as Bøhren and Ødegaard remark: “a successful implementation 
depends on whether corporate governance theory can provide well-founded 
restrictions on the equation system. Such a theory does not yet exist”.  
 
The results from empirical studies so far are mixed. There are many possible 
explanations for this. Mathiesen (2002) makes a rather detailed  analysis of possible 
errors, and if one is very statistically orthodox, then all kinds of probable 
measurement errors and problems with misspecifications make it in principle 
“impossible” to use OLS10 estimation, or two/three step least squares. But that is the 
case of almost all real-world problems, so the lesson to be learned is to use the results 
not as the truth, but as indicators strengthening or weakening certain hypotheses. It is 
beyond the scope of this paper to discuss these rather complex issues.  
                                                 
8 For some reason, Bøhren and Ødegaard use the term ‘univariate’ instead of ‘bivariate’ when a 
dependent variable is regressed on only one independent variable at the time. 
9 Bøhren and Ødegaard (2001a), p. 2 
10 OLS = Ordinary Least Squares, in Norwegian “minste kvadraters metode”, a very common 
statistical method for linear regressions analysis.  
13 
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Performance measures 
The performance measures most used in the literature are according to Bøhren and 
Ødegaard: 
• Tobins Q ratio (Q)  
• Return on Assets (RoA)  
• Return on stock (RoS) 
Mathiesen has a more elaborate list of performance measures, like return on equity, 
earnings per share. These are accounting based measures. Then there is stock market 
based measures: market returns, various measures of cumulated abnormal returns 
(CARs). The logic behind CARs is that only the difference in return after an 
unexpected change in one or more corporate management related factors can tell 
anything about its value. It is illustrative that the sudden death of top managers s 
have been studied as a proxy for a sudden change in the power of management in 
order to throw light on whether the stock market reacts to a weakening of managerial 
power, Mathiesen (2002, p. 138).  Finally, there are what Mathiesen call “hybrid 
measures” like market-to-book ratios and Tobins’s Q.11  
 
In Bøhren and Ødegaard there is a discussion of the correlation between the five 
measures they focus on and their statistical properties. The fact is that they are 
relatively weakly correlated. But that is maybe not so surprising since it is difficult to 
find a static, snap-shop measure of performance. It is hard to construct a ratio that 
gives a correct picture of the “real value” of the firm at any point in time, since 
investments, costs, sales may be distributed very unevenly over time. One illustrative 
example is Amazon.com, a firm that has a huge debt, but at the same time is able to 
convince the stock market that they will have huge future earnings and therefore can 
keep on selling stocks and bonds to such a degree that they have more than enough 
cash to sustain their business operations. Is Amazone.com performing well – or bad? 
Maybe the answer is that the final judgement lies in the future. The choice of Q to 
measure performance makes Amazon.com into a well performing firm, because 
Amazon has a great market value and relatively small assets as was the case of many 
dot.com firms. While more traditional firma might have a “low”, that is not so 
inflated market value, conservatively valued assets (book value), but real sales 
income and a real profit margin.  
 
For the non-expert reading this literature it seems that the performance measure, 
which after all is the most important variable to measure correctly and to give a 
reasonable interpretation of, is too little discussed. If ENRON was in the data as a 
success story until it collapsed – what kind of biases does that lead to in the data? 
There seems to be very little attention to the question of firms going bust and 
disappearing. And what are the implications for the regression analysis when 
“natural selection” in the form of more or less unexpected and spectacular 
bankruptcies occurs. Are there any patterns in the corporate governance mechanisms 
of those firms? Both Bøhren and Ødegaard and Mathiesen are rather silent on this 
point, and do not refer any findings regarding this phenomenon from the literature. It 
would have been very interesting to see if there was any pattern in ownership 
structures, concentration rates, and management compensation for the firms that fail.   
 
                                                 
11 Cf. Mathiesen (2002) chapter 5 for a extensive discussion of performance measures and  his 
Appendix 3 for some sample calculations.   
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Table 5 Bøhren and Ødegaard’s summary table of univariate regressions relating 
five alternative performance measures to a governance mechanism or a control.  
 Q RoA-5 RoS-5 RoA RoS  
Ownership concentration      
Herfindahl index −*** −*** − − − 
Largest owner −*** −*** − − − 
1-3 largest owners −*** −*** −* − − 
1-5 largest owners −*** −*** −** − − 
2nd largest owner − − −** + − 
3rd largest owner + − − − − 
4th largest owner + + − − − 
5th largest owner + + − − −** 
Owner type           
Aggregate state holdings −*** − −* − − 
Aggregate international holdings + − + − − 
Aggregate individual holdings +*** +*** +*** −*** +*** 
Aggregate financial holdings + + −* +*** + 
Aggregate nonfinancial holdings −*** −* − + − 
Aggregate intercorporate holdings −*** −** − +*** + 
Largest owner is state −*** − −* + − 
Largest owner is international − + + − + 
Largest owner is individual +*** +** +*** −* + 
Largest owner is financial − − − + − 
Largest owner is nonfinancial −*** − − +*** − 
Largest owner is listed −* −** − + + 
Insider ownership           
All insiders + + + − + 
Board members +*** +*** − + + 
Management team + +** +*** − + 
Primary insiders +*** +*** +* − + 
Board characteristics           
ln(Board size) − − −*** + − 
Security design           
Fraction voting shares +* − +* − + 
Financial policy           
Debt to assets −*** −*** −*** +*** − 
Dividends to price −*** +*** − +*** − 
Dividends to earnings − + − +*** + 
Market competition           
Industrial + − + + + 
Transport/shipping −*** −*** −** + − 
Offshore −* −*** + − + 
Controls           
ln(Firm value) +*** − − +*** +* 
Investments over income − − − + − 
Stock volatility −*** −** +*** −*** + 
Stock turnover +*** + +*** − +*** 
Stock beta + − +*** − + 
Note: The table summarizes the estimated sign and significance of bivariate relations between a performance 
measure (Q, RoA5, RoS5, RoA, and RoS) and an independent variable (governance mechanism or control 
variable). Q is the market value of the firm divided by its book value, RoA is the book return on total assets, RoS 
is the market return on stock, and variables subscripted with a 5 are five year averages. Statistical significance is 
indicated with *, **, and ***, which means the relationship is significant at the 5%, 2.5% and 1% level, 
respectively. Data for firms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange, 1989-1997. 
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This table illustrates the point about the “fragility” of the performance measure. I 
observe that RoA (return on assets) and RoS (return on stock) have few significant 
results generally and few common significant results, and in the single case the sign 
is opposite. Why these measures give such different results seems to get too little 
attention. This does not seem to be sufficiently theoretically and empirically justified. 
Bøhren and Ødegaard justify their choice of Q in the following way:  
 
There are several reasons why I choose Q as the basic performance measure. 
Q is by far the most commonly used proxy in the recent literature. Moreover, 
since consecutive observations of RoA5 and RoS5 are constructed from 
overlapping observations, the error terms in our pooled panel - time series 
regressions may be autocorrelated. Finally, because RoA and RoA5 are 
constructed from book values, they may be far from market returns and can 
also be influenced by management discretion. (p. 18) 
 
One would have liked more discussion, and since Bøhren and Ødegaard use book 
values instead of replacement values in operationalising Q, the critique against RoA 
and RoA5 for being based on book values should – as far as I can see – apply to Q as 
well.  
 
Bøhren and Ødegaard mention in a footnote that the R2 values are between 0 and 4% 
and the non-expert in regression analysis would have liked more discussion of this 
fact. At face value it means that the corporate governance mechanisms explain very 
little of the observed variation in performance. One interpretation could be that 
corporate governance mechanisms taken one by one are not an important explanation 
for such performance variation. I shall return to this point when discussing the 
different multivariate models below.  
 
 
 The findings of Bøhren and Ødegaard – from the bivariate to the 
full multivariate model 
 
In their paper Bøhren and Ødegaard go stepvise from the a bivariate model to the full 
multivariate model. They test different models, looking at more variables in each 
step. The results can be seen in the table below.  
 
Table 6 Summary of eight different models, Q as dependent variable.  
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
lntrans(1-5 largest owners) -***               
Largest owner     -***           
Herfindahl index       -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** 
Primary insiders (0 to 5)   +***             
Primary insiders (5 to 25)   +**             
Primary insiders (25 to 100)   -             
Primary insiders     +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** +***
Squared (Primary insiders)     -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -** 
Aggregate state holdings       -       - 
Aggregate international holdings       +       + 
Aggregate individual holdings       +***       +***
Aggregate nonfinancial holdings       -       - 
ln(Board size)         -***     -* 
Fraction voting shares           +***   +***
Debt to assets   -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** 
Dividends to earnings             - -* 
Industrial -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -** 
Transport/shipping -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** 
O[ff]shore -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** 
Investments over income -             - 
ln(Firm value) +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** +***
Stock volatility -               
n 905 1057 1057 1057 906 1042 1028 868
R2 0.14 0.20 0.22 0.23 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.27 
The *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 5%, 2.5% and 1% level. 
 
 
(1)  pure concentration (5)  concentration-insiderboard- 
(2)  pure insider (6)  concentration-insider-security design  
(3)  concentration-insider (7)  concentration-insider-financial 
policy  
(4)  concentration-insider-owner type (8)  all mechanisms and control variables 
17 
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Most of the eight models are well know from the corporate governance literature and 
it is a very valuable contribution to test them on the rich Norwegian data.  
 
The main findings are according to Bøhren and Ødegaard: 
 
1. Ownership concentration has a negative impact on  economic performance 
Performance increases with insider ownership up to roughly 60% and then 
decreases. 
2. Individual owners are associated with higher performance than other outside 
owners. 
3. Performance is inversely related to board size, the fraction of non-voting 
shares outstanding, and financial leverage. 
4. Performance varies systematically with industry membership and size. 
 
 
The first point - the negative impact of ownership concentration is contrary to the 
general trend of most other empirical studies and to most of the theoretical reasoning 
around the agency problem. It is generally argued that in order to monitor and control 
managers, large owners will be more efficient since small owners have both 
relatively high costs of organizing themselves and the opportunity to free ride.  
 
This negative finding on ownership concentration is the strongest finding of Bøhren 
and Ødegaard, it is the result that survives most of the different model specifications. 
Bøhren and Ødegaard point to a recent German study that finds a negative relation 
between ownership concentration and RoA, but they do not discuss whether it is 
reasonable to support their argument with  a study that uses another  performance 
measure, RoA, given that results are very sensitive to the choice of performance 
measure. In addition - if I understand them correctly - in their own study, RoA, do 
not confirm this negative relationship. 
  
The only other variables that are significant in all models are the three industry 
controls and firm size, the latter measured as the natural log of the firms’ value. 
Bøhren and Ødegaard argue that it is difficult to interpret the industry variables. 
They ought to be proxies for competition, but might function as a governance 
independent industry effect. I think Bøhren and Ødegaard are right in pointing out 
that a these industry variables are very crude and hard to interpret.  
 
Bøhren and Ødegaard comment the firm size variable as follows: “The very 
consistent, positive association between firm size and performance reflects a 
governance-independent source of value creation, possibly due to market power and 
economies of scale and scope.” Also Mathiesen (p. 226) states this even clearer:  
 
 “Firm size is extremely significant and positively related to performance. This result 
is remarkably robust and holds independent of applied sample, performance measure 
and whether the regressions are weighted or not. [...] The evidence is particularly 
strong for regressions on MTB12...” 
  
                                                 
12 MTB = market-to-book values, that is the same measure as the Q used by Bøhren and Ødegaard 
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I think this is a correct observation, an obvious fact. The question now is how to 
handle this strong finding.  What does it tell us about what factors that influence 
performance? Is the key to understanding the excellent performance of Microsoft, 
IBM or any such giant that their corporate governance mechanisms are superior? Or 
has their performance a lot do to with market power? And how did they get this 
market power? In my opinion not mainly due to any configuration of inside or 
outside ownership or size of the board etc. The key issue are a business strategy, in 
many – if not most - cases an innovation strategy in the broad sense. That is, to get 
and keep a technology based competitive advantage, including locking-in customers 
in their technology. Such technological advantages are in their turn often is 
connected to positive feedback loops due to economies of scale and scope. 
 
It is beyond the scope of this note to discuss this at any length, but it is well known 
that general equilibrium theory is hard to reconcile with the existence of economies 
of scale. And that one in my opinion can argue convincingly that competition, and by 
this I mean real life price and quality competition, not the mechanical adjustment of 
quantities to given prices like in general equilibrium theory, leads to the unfit being 
forced out of business and leaving the survivors with monopoly-like market power. 
“Big firm” is significant, but it is not a disequilibrium phenomenon, it is a result of 
the dynamics of competition itself. All firms try to get and keep a technological 
advantage/monopoly. Consequently they need continuously to innovate to keep a 
certain distance to competitors.  
 
The amount of variation explained 
If I take a look at the R2 values in Table 6 they are in the range from 14% to 27%, but 
it is not reported how much of the variance is explained by industry and size. 
Mathiesen reports that his industry dummies contribute significantly to the adjusted 
R2, between 6 – 15% while some of the corporate governance mechanisms contribute 
less than 1% point. There seems to be a tendency that corporate governance 
mechanisms can explain less of the variation in performance than some other very 
ordinary variables, especially industrial sector and size.  
 
The choice of variables 
Another question is the choice of variables. Bøhren and Ødegaard make a reasonable 
choice in my opinion. From an innovation perspective some proxy for R&D would 
have been of special interest. Mathiesen (2002) reports (p. 226) that R&D divided by 
assets “is strongly significant and positive” when using Q ( = market-to-book), but 
“strongly significant and negative” using return on assets (RoA ). 
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Bøhren and Ødegaard run the full model (8) with the alternative performance 
measures. This gives the following table.  
Table 7 Full multivariate model using the five different performance measures 
 Q  ROA5  ROS5  ROA  ROS 
Herfindahl index -*** - + + + 
Primary insiders +*** +*** - +** + 
Primary insiders squared -** -** + -*** - 
Aggregate state - + - -*** - 
Aggregate internat. + + + -*** - 
Aggregate individual +*** + +*** - +*** 
Aggregate nonfinancial - - - - - 
ln(board size) -* - -** + - 
Fraction voting shares +*** - +* - + 
Debt/assets -*** -*** -*** +* - 
Dividends/earnings -* + - +** - 
Industrial -** -*** +** - + 
Transport+shipping -*** -** + - + 
Offshore -*** -*** + - + 
Investment/income - - - + + 
ln(firm value) +*** - + + +*** 
n 868 851 621 869 743 
R2 0.27 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.05 
The *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 5%, 2.5% and 1% level 
 
They conclude that “there is very low consistency across performance measures” and 
that the concentration measure, the Herfindahl index, is only significant for Q. They 
report that they get similar results for the other (1) – (7) models, and that the overall 
conclusion is that “findings based on Tobin’s Q cannot be generalized to other 
performance measures”. Once more I stumble into the problem of measuring 
performance.  
 
 
 Significance, equilibrium and policy 
Bøhren and Ødegaard draw the following conclusion based on the significant results 
from their eight models: “Finally, since I find that several mechanisms covary 
significantly with economic performance, I reject the hypothesis that the equilibrium 
condition prevails. Performance is inferior because most firms have a sub-optimal set 
of governance mechanisms.” 
 
Since Bøhren and Ødegaard want to be in equilibrium, in “first best”, the policy 
implications of this are clear and on the basis of the regression results, the increase in 
firm value and/or performance of diminishing the disequilibrium can be quantified. 
Bøhren and Ødegaard give some examples:  
 
“Suppose the largest owner initially holds 28% of the equity in a firm with Q 
= 1.558. If this owner decides to decrease the stake by ten percentage points 
to 18%, our model predicts that Q will increase from 1.558 to 1.620. This 
means the market value of the firm grows by 0.4% for every percentage point 
increase in concentration. Since the average firm value in the sample is NOK 
2 bill., this corresponds to a value growth of NOK 8 mill. (p. 26) 
 
I shall not go into these rather technical calculations. The important thing here is why 
should the owner decide to reduce his share? Or the other way around, hasn’t he13 
bought just that amount of shares because he, as an rational economic agent - 
considers it the best thing to do. To sell or buy shares in a listed company is not that 
difficult and goes on all the time, so why should I suppose that he by himself should 
reduce his share? And how should public policy makers construct incentives to make 
that happen? After all even this drastic reduction of the share of the largest owner 
does not mean more than NOK 8 mill. of increased value of the average firm. The 
chance that the implementation of an incentive scheme correcting the concentration 
of ownership would cost a lot and not be very efficient is far from negligible.  
 
In the same manner – and with greater effect maybe one should raise insider 
holdings, or maybe reduce the size of the board with one member. To do the latter 
would increase firm value with NOK 20 mill. To reduce the board size is of course 
more realistic since in a way it is more of an administrative decision taken by the 
General Meeting, or maybe the board itself. And if the value increases as predicted, 
one could even pay people for leaving. Norwegian boards are fairly small by 
international standards according. The average number is 7; median 6 members and 
75% of the boards have 8 members or less14. Their argument is that smaller groups 
communicate better and that is of course correct, but it is hard to see that going from 
8 to 7 should make much difference. Again we are back to the crux of the matter: 
isn’t the size of the board often rather random in the range from 6-10? Is that really a 
corporate governance mechanism? Isn’t the real important thing what kind of 
business strategy the board decides on? If firms on their own do not reduce board 
size in order to get closer to equilibrium and become more efficient, should the 
public intervene with incentive schemes or regulation to make it happen? 
 
 
                                                 
13 For simplicity I us he, it is in most cases a man. 
14 Cf. Bøhren and Ødegaard (2001a), p. 15 
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Improving the modelling and getting less significant results 
In the regressions above Bøhren and Ødegaard use pooled data, that is, data from the 
whole period 1989 – 1997 are lumped together. This creates some statistical 
problems. First of all it means that causation and endogeneity cannot be addressed. 
Secondly - there might be changes in the relationship between the values. The first 
part of the period is marked by stagnation; the latter part is marked by economic 
upturn. Finally there  are potential problems autocorrelation and multicollinearity.  
Bøhren and Ødegaard use different techniques to try to get around these problems by 
running cross-section regressions for each year in combination with parameter 
estimates done on the full set of observations. When running regressions year by year 
the number of observations then drops from about nine hundred to about one hundred 
each year. That of course makes it much more difficult to get significant results and 
consequently the equilibrium hypothesis, i.e. that all corporate governance 
mechanisms are used optimally = no significance, will be much harder to reject.  
Table 8 Year by year regression of the full model, 8 variables 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
constant + + - - + - -* + - 
Herfindahl index -*** -* -* - - -*** - - - 
Primary insiders + - + + + + + + + 
Squared (Primary insiders) + + + - - - + - - 
Aggregate state holdings + + + + - + + - - 
Aggregate international + + + - + +* +*** + + 
Aggregate individual + + + + + + + +** + 
Aggregate nonfinancial + + + - - + + + - 
ln(Board size) -*** - - - - - +* - - 
Fraction voting shares + + + - + + +*** + + 
Debt to assets - - -* + - -* -** -*** -*** 
Dividend payout ratio + + + - - + - - - 
Industrial - - + - - - - - - 
Transport/shipping - -* -* - -** -*** - - - 
Offshore - - -* - - -* - - - 
Investments over income + - - - - - - - - 
ln(Firm value) +*** +* + +*** + +* + + +* 
n 81 73 64 83 90 98 108 118 153 
R2 0.35 0.30 0.37 0.34 0.34 0.43 0.53 0.40 0.36 
The *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 5%, 2.5% and 1% level 
 
The table shows as expected that the level of significance drops. No variable is 
significant throughout the whole period. Size is consistently positive and has 5 years 
with some level of significance. But the same is the case with debt to assets and it is 
not easy to explain why. But again – the number of observations is radically lower 
than when the data are pooled. In order to get more reliable estimates to base policy 
on, one goes from pooled data – which cannot handle structural change, i.e. the 
influence of the business cycle – to year by year data - and one gets fewer significant 
results. This of course is an old dilemma: either the policy-maker must either base 
himself on significant but biased estimates or none at all.  
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Simultaneous equation systems - reverse causation 
Another problem with the previous models is that they only tested the effects of 
governance mechanisms on performance, and did not test if the causation is in the 
other direction. That is, that performance influences the choice of governance 
mechanisms. One obvious example is when managers are buying shares or are asking 
for options when they know they are going make good profits15. Another is the 
reward given to managers. Are they highly paid ex ante in order to be motivated to 
perform well, or are they rewarded generously ex post, when financial performance 
is good? Or is both the case?  
 
In simultaneous systems there is an identification problem that must be solved by – 
in most cases - a combination of theoretical predictions limiting the values of the 
parameters and the use of so-called instrumental variables, i.e. variables that are 
proxies for the variables that are endogenous in the equation system. One example is 
stock beta (a measure of systematic risk) used as an instrument variable for Q since 
mainstream asset pricing theory holds that systematic risk directly influences the 
value of the firm, Q, through the cost of capital. The technical aspects of this are 
beyond the competence of this author, but what is interesting for the non-technical 
reader is the results and especially Bøhren and Ødegaard’s interpretation. As they 
formulate it: “There is a remarkable lack of significance, and the tendency to produce 
significant coefficients differs across models”. Models here mean different sets of 
instrument variables. Stock beta for example never turns out significantly correlated 
to Q.  
 
This lack of significance also characterizes other studies using simultaneous equation 
systems, but, according to Bøhren and Ødegaard, the most common “interpretation 
of the insignificant findings is that such evidence supports the equilibrium 
hypothesis” among those who have tested such models. Bøhren and Ødegaard do not 
agree with this interpretation: 
 
We are not convinced by this interpretation, which implicitly assumes that the 
system is better specified than single-equation models. As there exists no 
proper theoretical basis for establishing instruments, I test out three different 
instrument sets and find that the qualitative conclusions are sensitive to the 
choice of instruments. In particular, the choice of instruments decides 
whether or not our data supports the equilibrium argument. It also determines 
what to conclude about mechanism interaction and reverse causation. (p. 33)  
 
 Bøhren and Ødegaard do not agree that the simultaneous systems at present 
obviously are a more suitable method for studying these mechanisms than single 
equation modeling. I stumble again into the problem that the question of general 
equilibrium, of whether “natural selection hypothesis” can be used. But since this is 
not in my opinion based on a real discussion of whether general equilibrium, “first 
best” is a fruitful research paradigm, but becomes a matter of subjective choice. In 
other words, it becomes too much of a ad hoc subjective choice whether you doubt 
the specific model or chooses to doubt the equilibrium hypothesis. As soon ass one 
starts to question the equilibrium hypothesis, then there is no reason why one should 
not be very critical of the very specific modeling of the managers’ motives as those 
 
15 Mathiesen focuses very much on these issues, using various techniques with lagged variables etc. to 
estimate the direction of causality.  
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of a pure homo economicus. But as soon as one starts to seriously question such 
basic assumptions, there is no reason to see the problems of corporate governance 
primarily as an agency problem.  
 
 
 Summary and conclusions 
The question of whether corporate governance matters for economic performance is 
at the same time a debate of the meaning of this concept. In most of the existing 
literature this is interpreted as an agency problem stemming from the separation of 
ownership and control. The data chosen to study various aspects and hypothesis 
regarding this agency problem are various ownership characteristics, like 
concentration, type of owner, size of board etc, but not the actual, substantial 
business strategies of these firms like their R&D strategy, their human resource 
management strategy etc.  
 
In my opinion there is no very strong link between the type of owner, degree of 
ownership concentration, inside ownership etc. - and business strategy. There is great 
heterogeneity when it comes to business strategies, there is no “representative” 
strategy and never can be. All firms cannot follow the same strategy when the name 
of the game is to compete with the others, taking advantage of path dependency, the 
effects of scale and scope, all other types of competitive advantages.  
 
A manager of a pension fund might have just as good an understanding of the actual 
market dynamics as an individual shareholder. The complex web of strategies and 
counter strategies of firms makes it very difficult to predict – using ownership 
characteristics - who will be successful.  Although I hold that one should not expect 
ownership characteristics to be that important,  they of course warrant to be 
examined carefully, not the least because “agency problems” are regarded as very 
important in mainstream economics. Empirical research sometimes comes up with 
strong and surprising results, challenging conventional wisdom.  
 
If Bøhren and Ødegaard and Mathiesen are representative of the state of the art – and 
I think they are -  since their data are better than what has previously been used, so 
far it seems to me that the hypothesis that the “corporate governance as an agency 
hypothesis” is not that important for firm and economy performance has survived 
because: 
 
- The share of variation in firm performance explained by the various  
corporate governance mechanisms is generally very low.  
- Other traditional variables like industry and size explain more - as predicted 
by theories that use a innovation oriented, dynamic, time and path-dependent 
approach to explain firm performance. 
- All of the results are very sensitive to the performance measure chosen 
- the loss of significance is dramatic when one tries to use correct and/or more 
advanced techniques  
 
Whether one thinks that regression results are convincing is always to a very large 
extent the result of a complex evaluation of theory, models, data and results. In short  
there is ample room subjective choice. But if one holds the opinion that the results 
from such exercises are solid, this then raises the question of the policy implications 
and not the least  the question of the ultimate goal of policy. Is the goal of public 
policy in the field of  corporate governance to get firms back to the equilibrium 
25 
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point? If this is the case, is the policy advice that follows from this really feasible? 
To take as Bøhren and Ødegaard’s strongest results, that ownership concentration 
“destroys value”. How are individuals and/or public authorities going to decrease 
ownership concentration? In particular the Norwegian ownership concentration - 
which by European standards is low, although not as low as the US and UK – but is 
it really feasible to lower that significantly? If one is to achieve a substantial 
lowering of ownership concentration then one have to use some rather strong 
incentive mechanisms, to use some rather dramatic measures. Is this really feasible, 
and do researchers and policy makters what other effects on innovation and 
productivity might such a set of radical incentives and measures might have?  
 
If ownership concentration is an indicator of disequilibrium, then most European 
countries really have a job to do taking into consideration their high levels of 
ownership concentration. And how is ownership concentration going to be reduced 
when it is the result of one of the freest and most liquid markets in advanced market 
economies, namely the stock exchange?  
 
As Bøhren and Ødegaard point out themselves, this result “which is our strongest 
finding, is atypical in the literature, and it questions the fundamental agency 
hypothesis…that if managers that are not closely monitored by powerful owners they 
will not fulfill their fiduciary duty…” (p. 36). There is a small paradox here because 
this concentration-is-beneficial “rests on the implicit assumption that owners are 
competent, i.e. they know at least as well as managers how to run the firm in a value 
creating way” (p. 4).  But that in its turn contradict the reason why the owners of 
capital handed control over their money over to the managers in the first place. 
Wasn’t that precisely because the owners of capital did not have the necessary 
managerial competences, but a relative abundance of capital? If owners do not know 
better - what is then left of the whole agency problem? My tentative answer to that is 
that not very much is left of the agency problem as it is traditionally formulated. The 
main reason is that the notion of ‘perfect information’ which this whole way of 
reasoning is wrong. No person, no organization can have perfect information, be all 
knowing. On the contrary a lot of the real behavior of persons and firms can only be 
explained as a response to the fact that we do not have perfect information. We are 
not even able to digest more that fractions of the high quality information available 
etc.  But this is an fundamental debate way beyond the limited scope of this paper.  
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STEP-gruppen ble etablert i 1991 for å forsyne 
beslutningstakere med forskning knyttet til alle 
sider ved innovasjon og teknologisk endring, med 
særlig vekt på forholdet mellom innovasjon, 
økonomisk vekst og de samfunnsmessige 
omgivelser. Basis for gruppens arbeid er 
erkjennelsen av at utviklingen innen vitenskap og 
teknologi er fundamental for økonomisk vekst. Det 
gjenstår likevel mange uløste problemer omkring 
hvordan prosessen med vitenskapelig og 
teknologisk endring forløper, og hvordan denne 
prosessen får samfunnsmessige og økonomiske 
konsekvenser. Forståelse av denne prosessen er av 
stor betydning for utformingen og iverksettelsen av 
forsknings-, teknologi- og innovasjonspolitikken.  
Forskningen i STEP-gruppen er derfor sentrert 
omkring historiske, økonomiske, sosiologiske og 
organisatoriske spørsmål som er relevante for de 
brede feltene innovasjonspolitikk og økonomisk 
vekst.  
 
 
The STEP-group was established in 1991 to support 
policy-makers with research on all aspects of 
innovation and technological change, with particular 
emphasis on the relationships between innovation, 
economic growth and the social context. The basis 
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technology and innovation are fundamental to 
economic growth; yet there remain many unresolved 
problems about how the processes of scientific and 
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they have social and economic impacts. Resolving 
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implementation of science, technology and 
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